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c TÜBİTAK
⃝
doi:10.3906/elk-1112-55

Stopping spam with sending session verification
Ahmet BARAN∗
Department of Computer Technologies, Erzincan University, Vocational High School, Erzincan, Turkey
Received: 14.12.2011

•

Accepted: 23.07.2012

•

Published Online: 30.10.2013

•

Printed: 25.11.2013

Abstract: Spam has become one of the most significant problems for Internet communication and users today. The
traditional filtering methods and signature-based spam blocking systems that have come into prominence recently fall
short, as statistics demonstrate that spam further mounts up day after day. In this study, a new method is recommended
to block spam mails. In this recommended method, a mail sending session is verified during mail envelope communication
by adding small attachments to the simple mail transfer protocol, so spam mails can be blocked before leaving the sender
domain or relay machine. Additionally, hijacked user accounts are able to be detected by statistical filtering software
support, and spam mails coming from these users can be blocked and the account owners can be informed. According
to the test results, 99.4% of the spam mails were able to be stopped by the proposed method, and the false positive
problem was able to be solved and a significant decrease in the false negative percentages was ensured.
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1. Introduction
Today, e-mail communication occupies quite an important space in our daily lives. Additionally, e-mails called
spam have turned into an important problem for Internet users and they even threaten the future of the
Internet system. Spam mails cause considerable damage to companies and their employees, e-trade environment,
customers, Internet services providers (ISPs), email service providers (ESPs), and public institutions.
States attempt to take legal precautions enacting various regulations to block spam that leads to massive
financial losses and the violation of laws [1,2]. On the other hand, a great many methods were proposed to
block spams in academic and commercial circles and are being used [3–6]. However, these methods fall short, as
statistics report that spam amounts have been increasing each day. According to the statistics of the Symantec
Intelligence Report, while spam mails constituted 8% of the total e-mail traffic in 2001, they constituted 70%
in 2005 and 77.8% as of July 2011 [7].
Considering the recipients, a recipient receives a lot of e-mails that he/she does not want each day. Mail
recipients are spammed by spammers exploiting the shortcomings of the still used simple mail transfer protocol
(SMTP) system using the following 5 methods:
They receive a great deal of e-mails:
• From an inexistent domain,
• A spam distributing domain,
• An existent domain but an inexistent e-mail address,
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• An existent domain and e-mail address, but not sent from that particular e-mail address,
• An existent domain and e-mail address, sent from that particular e-mail address, but the e-mail owner is
not aware of that mail
The objective of antispam techniques is to block these unwanted mails and their approach styles vary.
There is still no technique that can block all of these mentioned methods of spammers in the literature; many of
the used blocking methods cannot prevent the most important damage of spam (such as bandwidth use, storage
cost).
In this study, a spam blocking system is proposed that is based on reciprocal controls and informing in
order to block all of these methods of spammers. The suggested method is a developed version of a combination
of the sender policy framework (SPF) [8], bounce address tag validation (BATV) [9], and domain key identified
mail (DKIM) [10] signature-based methods and statistical filtering. In this method, domains broadcast an
address record in their domain name system (DNS) servers as in the SPF method. Unlike the SPF method, this
record does not include the Internet protocol (IP) of the server having authority to the send mail; it includes
the IP of a verification server (VS) with which the receivers can make an inquiry of the mail sending session.
In the suggested method, by making the mail sending session verification during the envelope communication
by means of the VS, it is decided whether the mail is legitimate or spam. In the suggested method, in order to
make session control, which is different from the BATV method where the local parts of the mails are modified,
small changes are suggested in the SMTP communication. The method works on the basis of the verification
of the unique session ID and the receiver and sender mail addresses, and the authenticity of the message is
ensured with the usage of the DKIM method. At the same time, the method is operated in combination with a
statistical filtering method in the receiver mail server in order to distinguish the mails being sent from hijacked
accounts and to provide a notification to the sender mail server.
This method is a way that merges the mentioned methods and it differentiates from studies in the
literature in 2 ways. In the first one, a vast majority of spam mails can be blocked before leaving the sender
domain or relay by making a sending session verification in the course of the mail communication, which is
different from techniques available during envelope communication in the literature. The second feature of the
system, which we know is not in the literature, is to be able to inform the sender domain and user by providing
feedback to the sender domain as a result of the e-mail communication for the purpose of blocking e-mails
spreading from the hijacked user accounts.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives some information about the behavior
of spammers and antispam techniques. In Section 3, we describe our approach, and Section 4 gives the results
and details of our system’s experimental test bed implementation. We provide our conclusions in Section 5.
2. Spammers and antispammers
2.1. Behavior of spammers
The most critical element for spam mail senders is that they cover their tracks. Therefore, spammers do not
directly send spam mails. Instead, they send either by hijacking others’ computers or accounts and using these
computers or computers that were inaccurately configured on the Internet, or using Internet connections that
cannot be followed.
A vast majority of spams today spread out from networks comprised of hijacked computers that are called
bots or zombies and are controlled by spam operators [11,12]. Another widespread method that spammers use to
hide their identities is to use open proxies [13]. Having said that, spammers usually use servers called mail relays
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to profit from their time and effort [14,15]. On the other hand, there are plenty of methods for accessing the
Internet without using an individual or fixed physical connection and they cannot be followed. Internet cafes;
illegal wireless connections; campus networks, in which the control and log mechanisms of many universities are
not operated; and Internet access from ISPs by aliases and untraced payment methods can be given as examples
for these methods. In such situations, spammers can spread spam without hiding their identities or using the
aforementioned methods [16].
2.2. Operations of antispammers
There are a variety of antispam techniques. We classify them into 3 groups: filter-based approaches, signaturebased approaches, and other approaches. Each class of approaches has its own advantages and disadvantages.
Under specific circumstances, 2 or more approaches may work more effectively when they work together.
In nonstatistical filtering methods, the classic blacklist, whitelist, and graylist approaches are employed
[17]. A great deal of content analysis-based statistical filter methods have been recommended for fighting spam.
The main content analysis studies are naı̈ve Bayes, support vector machines, artificial neural networks, logistic
regression, lazy learning, artificial immune systems, boosting, ensembles, image analysis, and hybrid methods.
The authors in [3–5] classified and evaluated these methods in their studies.
Spam mails are attempted to be blocked by trying to determine the sender’s identity in signature-based
methods. Secure/multipurpose Internet mail extensions (S/MIME) [18], OpenPGP [19], BATV [9], DKIM [10],
certified server validation (CSV) [20] and sender policy framework [8] + sender ID framework (SPF + SIDF)
[21] methods are principal signature-based methods. The authors in [6] and [22] examined these methods and
assessed their shortcomings.
On the other hand, transmission control protocol blocking, verification, payment-based, limitation of
outgoing mails, address obscuring techniques, and reputation-based methods are some of the other methods
recommended for blocking spams [4].
3. Recommended system
Considering the mail sender, a sender writes his/her e-mail using a mail transfer agent (MTA) or mail user
agent (MUA) in a formal SMTP communication. The prepared e-mail is sent to the organization’s MTA, either
directly by intraorganization SMTP communication or over the Webmail server via the hypertext transfer
protocol secure HTTP(S) protocol. The last MTA in the sender’s organization (SO) can either connect to the
MTA of the receiver’s organization (RO) via the SMTP or make a SMTP connection to another server on the
Internet. This server can be a mail relay or a gateway. After using a mail relay or gateway one time, mail can
pass through many relay or gateway machines until it reaches the MTA of the RO. The RO can use more than
one MTA as the SO and the last MTA sends e-mail to a mail delivery agent (MDA) for it to be stored. The
receiver accesses the message using post office protocol or Internet message access protocol, in general, by a
MUA [23].
That being said, e-mail communications following quite distinct ways other than the one explained above
are also possible [4] and spammers usually employ these methods. Spammers, who connect to the Internet by
bots and untraceable connections, send spam mails with a MTA or MUA via either connecting to the MTA of
a RO or over a SMTP relay. Spammers possessing traceable connections send spams to receivers by necessarily
passing over a gateway. The common point of sending such e-mails is that these e-mails are sent without passing
over the MTA of the sender’s domain. Port blocking (e.g., Port 25) is a quite frequently used method for the
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purpose of canceling mail sending without passing over the domain MTA by computers on a domain and it is
used in this study as well [24]. Considering the sender’s domain, this method cuts most of the spam sent from
the domain, except for that bot software, which accesses the ESP user information, using the way that direct
legal e-mails use. As for the receiver’s domain, it has no use in the name of the sender’s domain due to the fact
that they make domain spoofing by computers on other domains.
In a nutshell, considering the receiver, an incoming e-mail can be sorted into 2 categories: mails that
pass over the sender’s MTA and ones that do not. The first point recommended in the method proposed in this
article is to discard e-mails that do not pass over the sender’s MTA and only take into account the ones that do
pass over the sender’s MTA. To understand which e-mails pass over the sender’s MTA, a VS is recommended
in which the logs in the sender’s domain are kept in a special format. The second suggested point is to rate
the domain e-mail users in the sender’s domain through feedback coming from other domains with respect to
e-mails that they sent.
The system recommended in this method has the structure in Figure 1. The address verification
system, which is not available in the standard e-mail communication system currently used hardware-wise,
is recommended in the schema. The function of this server for small- and medium-range ESPs can be fulfilled
in the domain MTA server as well. Nevertheless, a number of small additions are made to the existent SMTP
for goals to be realized in terms of operation.

Figure 1. Recommended e-mail communication schema.

The sender in the recommended schema sends e-mail to the MTA of the sender’s domain with an internal
SMTP client after preparing e-mail (1). If there is more than one MTA in the sender’s domain, the MTA here
refers to the last MTA. The sender’s MTA (SMTA) questions either the DNS server that the domain has or the
previously configured DNS server to learn IP information of the target domain, by first determining the target
domain from the incoming e-mail information (2). When the DNS server gets back to the SMTA as a result of
the query, the SMTA responds in 2 ways with regard to the incoming response.
If the DNS query result is successful (if the receiver domain is available), the SMTA commands the VS
to insert a record, whose structure is given in Table 1 (3). This record consists of a local timestamp, a unique
ID value given to every e-mail, the sender’s e-mail, receiver’s e-mail, IP address of the authorized questioning,
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sender rating, and result of the mail. However, the first 4 in the list are still kept as standard in many e-mail
sending software, and the last 3 are key for the method recommended in this study. An authorized IP address
is the IP address of the reliable relay machine or the receiver’s MTA (RMTA) obtained as a result of the
DNS query. The VS records a rating value on the space of the sender’s rating of the record by calculating it
with respect to previous e-mail sending statistics of the owner of the sender e-mail in the record’s insert. The
calculation and use of the rating value will be explained later. Moreover, the space of the result of the mail, on
which the evaluation result of the e-mail sending operation in the receiver’s domain is written, is kept in this
record. Here, another critical point is that a separate record is added for each receiver when there is more than
one mail receiver.
Table 1. Structure of the logging table in the VS.

Timestamp

Unique ID

Sender e-mail

Receiver e-mail

IP address of
authorized
questioning

Sender rating (%)

Result of mail

If the DNS query result is unsuccessful (if there is no receiver domain) or the communication is terminated
due to queries made by the RMTA after this point, the SMTA commands the VS to update the rating value of
the sender user with the thought that it sent spam.
Accompanying the formation of the record in Table 1, the VS either informs its internal or the institution’s
firewall that the IP in the record has the authorization of access. After this command, a record as in Table
2 is added to the firewall. This record holds the information of the message ID, IP address of the authorized
questioning, and the last validity time of record. With the addition of the record, the firewall allows access
of the respective IP to the VS and erases the record when its last validity time arrives. The objective of the
firewall here is to create a tunnel that can block unnecessary and malicious queries of the VS database, in big
ESPs in particular. The period of the last validity time info is 48 h, as a default, and it can be changed with
respect to the institution policies.
Table 2. Rule record of the firewall of sender domain.

Message ID

IP address of authorized
questioning

Last validity time

At this juncture, the SMTA communicates with the RMTA (4). The RMTA, when it receives the
request, queries either its own domain server or other DNS servers on the Internet to first understand whether
that domain exists and find out the domain’s DNS server (5). If the sender domain cannot be found, then it
terminates the connection. Afterwards, it queries the respective domain from reputation servers on the Internet
(6). It continues or terminates the connection based on the result of the incoming information. The Spamhaus
domain block list (DBL) database [25] is used in the recommended method in this study to detect spam-only
servers.
For continued communication, the RMTA requests the mail from, mail to, and unique ID information
from the SMTA. While the mail to and mail from information is used in the ongoing SMTP communication,
the system makes an addition to the conversation part of the SMTP communication here. The recommended
SMTA conversation should be step by step and in order, as in Figure 2. Accordingly, after checking the existence
of the sender’s domain and reputation, the RMTA first waits for the sender and receiver information from the
SMTA. In the wake of receiving the sender and receiver information, whether the receiver is situated on the
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domain is checked. If the receiver is not situated on the domain (possibility of directory attack), the connection
is terminated. If the receiver presents on the domain, the RMTA sends 250 OK to the SMTA. Following this
message, the RMTA awaits either the unique ID or DATA information from the SMTA. If the SMTA sends a
DATA message, the RMTA sets the spam score of the e-mail to a predetermined K value, assuming that the
sender’s domain does not use this control scheme.
R. 220 receiverdom.com
S. HELO senderdom.com
if (senderdomain not exists ) then reply with 554
else
R.
if (senderdomain in DBL) then reply with 554
S.
else
R. 250 receiverdom.com
S. MAIL FROM: sender@senderdomain.com
R. 250 Ok.
RCPT TO: receiver@receiverdom.com
if (receiver not exists ) then reply with 554
else
250 Ok.
S.

R.
S.

R.
S.
S.
S.
R.

R.
S.
R.

UNIQUEID: EH7YG9K12
if (uniqueid is not
verified from VS) then
reply with 554 else
250 Ok.
DATA
DATA
SpamScore = SenderRating
SpamScore = K
354 enter mail, end with line containing only “.”
Subject : Hello
Hello, can you call me?
.
250 Ok. Queued as receivermsgid.
SpamScore + = CAS Result
if (SpamScore ≥ Threshold Value) then
mark as spam
else mark as legitimate
250 Ok. Mail is received with “marked” value
QUIT
221 Bye

STAGE 1

STAGE 2

STAGE 3

STAGE 4

STAGE 5

STAGE 6

Figure 2. Stages of the recommended SMTP conversation.

If the SMTA sends a unique ID message and info to the RMTA, the RMTA queries the DNS server of
the sender’s domain that it obtained at the fifth step (7). In the recommended method, the sender’s domain
issues the IP address information of the VS in the DNS server. If the IP information record of the VS machine
is not available in the sender’s domain DNS server, the RMTA terminates the connection. After learning the
VS’s address, the RMTA sends the Message ID information to this server for query (8). If the RMTA cannot
connect to the VS server, it terminates the SMTA connection (due to reasons such as firewall access). After the
RMTA connects to the VS server, the VS queries the unique ID value that it acquired from the incoming query
in the database. If any record cannot be found or there is an IP incompatibility, the VS responds negatively
to the RMTA, and then the RMTA sends a no to the SMTA, assuming with this response that the e-mail is
fake and terminates connection. If any record is found and the IP of an inquirer is compatible with the IP in
the record, the sender address, receiver address, and sender rating value in the record are sent to the RMTA
(8). At this stage, the RMTA compares the information arriving from the VS and the SMTA. If there is no
compatibility, the connection is terminated and in the case of any compatibility, the spam score of the e-mail is
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set to the sender rating value. In this article, the ethical convenience of sending an individual’s rating value to
the ones he/she communicates with e-mail is not of interest.
If there is compatibility or the SMTA directly sends the DATA message to the RMTA, the RMTA
requests the mail data from the SMTA (354 messages). At this juncture, the SMTA adds a signature to the
mail header by calculating one from the mail body and the selected header information using one of the RSASHA1 and RSA-SHA256 algorithms, as identified in [10], to guarantee the integrity and accuracy of the mail
content. Afterwards, the SMTA sends the mail data to the RMTA (header and body). If the sender used the
recommended method and an encrypted signature (DKIM signature) was used in the e-mail, the signature is
decrypted by the public key attained as a result of the DNS query. Hence, the sender’s DNS server should issue
a public key as identified in [10]. The obtained value and hash value of the mail data are compared. If there is
no compatibility, it sends an error message to the sender, assuming that there was a change in the mail data,
and terminates communication.
Subsequently, mail data and information are sent to content analysis software (CAS) in the receiver’s
domain to conduct a content analysis (9). CAS (for instance, Spamassassin [26]) sends evaluation results
regarding whether e-mail is spam to the RMTA by employing statistical methods. The RMTA obtains a final
SpamScore by assembling the previous SpamScore and this info. If the SMTA sent a unique ID (if using the
method), the RMTA sends an e-mail SpamScore to the VS. The VS updates the result of the mail information
of the respective record, and transfers the record to the archive database and shuts down firewall access. On the
other hand, the RMTA marks the e-mail as reliable or suspicious with regard to the SpamScore and sends it to
the receiver MDA (10). Here, the from space in the body part and sender email information acquired during
the envelope communication are compared to prevent phishing and if there is a difference, the from space is
changed with the sender email and the from space information is given as information in the body data of the
e-mail. Finally, the e-mail is delivered from the RMTA to the receiver MUA (11).
The objective of carrying out the statistical analysis of the e-mails in the system is to detect hijacked
user accounts. It is used with the aim of informing the SO for the detection of computers that send e-mail from
user accounts without the will of the users. Accordingly, the resulting value of the statistical analysis operation
is sent to the VS by the RMTA in the sender’s domain. In our study, an effective spam zombie detection system
named SPOT [27] is employed for the user rating. The SO that rates the mail users with the returning feedback
information may resort to informing these users by blocking the hijacked or maliciously used accounts. On the
other hand, the system administrators, who do not want to trust the evaluation criteria and threshold of the
receiver domains on the Internet, can calculate and get this operation per se by processing each outgoing e-mail
in the domain in a CAS machine.

4. Experimental results
A structure as in Figure 3 was constituted to test the recommended system. A VS server was configured in
domain A for the verification operation and the database, whose structure is presented in Table 1, was run
on the MYSQL database server. Endian firewall software with an open source code [28] was configured in the
VS entry and it is operated on the structure of the record, as in Table 2. The sender’s domain (domain A)
publishes the IP address of the VS and DKIM public key in the records of the domain name server. MTA-A and
MTA-B were configured by the open source Postfix [29] software to ensure the SMTP communication stated in
the previous section.
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Figure 3. Structure of the testbed.

The 5 spamming methods explained in the first section were tested in the following configuration. No.
1 represents a mail sending request from an inexistent domain (or domain spoofing), no. 2 represents a mail
sending request from a spam-only domain, no. 3 represents a mail sending request from a mixed domain but a
fake (inexistent) e-mail account, no. 4 represents a mail sending request from a mixed domain with a real e-mail
user name but one that in reality does not come from its user, and no. 5 represents a mail sending request from
a mixed domain with a real e-mail user name and account but without its user’s notice. The test results with
regard to these possibilities are presented below.
As seen in Table 3, all of the spam mails coming from the first 4 ways were able to be blocked successfully.
The first 3 mails coming from no. 5 could not be stopped (but were marked as spam) and the rest were able to
be blocked. Hence, considering the spam mails coming from all of the ways, 99.4% of the spam mails were able
to be blocked in the suggested method.
Table 3. Test results.

Way
1
2
3
4
5

Sent mails
100
100
100
100
100

Number of stopped mails
Suggested SMTP stages
1
2
3 4
5
100 - 100 - - 100 - 100 - -

in
6
97

False
positive
0
0
0
0
0

False
negative
0
0
0
0
3

Here, if the e-mails represented in no. 2 were considered to be sent from a spam-only domain that does
not exist in the DBL list, and even though this domain does not use the recommended method, 97% of these
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mails could still be blocked at the sixth stage. Having said that, in a case where that number of spams coming
from a domain via both no. 5 and no. 2 increases, the receiver’s domain resorts to include these domains in
the blacklist by generating its own DBL.
5. Conclusions
Although various methods have been developed to block spam mails, the number of these mails soars day by day.
This case stems from spammers changing their behaviors by figuring out the shortcomings of the protocols and
antispam methods. Therefore, it is obvious that a secure end-to-end e-mail communication in a large network,
such as the Internet, can only be ensured by mutual controls that will be conducted both for the sender and
the receiver. The antispam method recommended in this study indicates that domains can safely communicate
with each other with e-mail after carrying out mutual controls. For this purpose, the current SMTP protocol,
which falls short now, needs to be updated. On the other hand, there is still no alternative to the reputation
servers of today in the detection of spam spreaders and these servers carry a big responsibility on their shoulders.
Additionally, sender domains should examine outgoing e-mails and receiver domains should examine incoming
e-mails by performing content analysis to block spams spreading through hijacking user accounts.
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http://www.ttnet.com.tr/i/assets/docs/spam pilot calisma sunumu 27mayis.pdf, 2009.
[25] The Domain Block Lists, Spamhaus Inc., available at http://www.spamhaus.org/dbl/, 2012.
[26] The Apache SpamAssassin Project, Apache Inc., available at http://spamassassin.apache.org/.
[27] Z. Duan, P. Chen, F. Sanchez, Y. Dong, M. Stephenson, J. Barker, “Detecting spam zombies by monitoring outgoing
messages”, The 28th IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, pp. 1764–1772, 2009.
[28] Open Source, Free, Community-Supported Security Solution, Endian Inc., available at http://www.endian.com.
[29] Postfix Project, available at http://www.postfix.org.

2268

